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THE STORY OF CHEVRO: THE MAKING OF AN
ACCIDENTAL LANDMARK
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC is one of the most famous cases in administrative
law, but it was not regarded that way when it was decided. To the justices who heard the
case, Chevron was a controversy about the validio of the "bubble" concept under the
Clean Air Act, not about the standard of review of agency interpretations of statutes.
Drawing on Justice Blackmun's papers, Professor Merrill shows that the Court was
initially closely divided, but Justice Stevens' opinion won them over, with no one paying
much attention to his innovations in the formulation of the standard of review or his
invocation of Presidential oversight as a reason to regard agencies as more appropriate
interpreters than courts. Chevron was almost instantly seized upon as a major decision
by the D.C. Circuit, however, and after establishing itself as a leading case there, it
migrated back to the Supreme Court, where it eventually came to be regarded as a
landmark decision by the Court that rendered it. The Stoy of Chevron raises interesting
questions about the role of accidents and self-interested promotion in the making of great
cases, as well as about how judicial mutations have shaped the development of
administrative law. **
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. This Article originally
appeared as a chapter in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES (Peter L. Strauss ed., Foundation
Press 2006), and is reprinted with the permission of Foundation Press, which is gratefully
acknowledged. I have taken the liberty of modifying the text to incorporate some minor
revisions and more up-to-date information found in Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are
Made Not Born, which appears as a chapter in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES
(William N. Eskridge,Jr., et al. eds., Foundation Press 2011), and Thomas W. Merrill, Justice
Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 551 (2012). Many thanks to Brad Lipton
and Daniel Boyle for research assistance.
** The Administrative Law Review has reprinted this piece with permission from West
Academic and has maintained the publisher's style and formatting conventions to best
represent the work in its original form.
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INTRODUCTION
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. I is the Supreme
Court's leading statement about the division of authority between agencies
and courts in interpreting statutes. The two-step framework announced by
Chevron for resolving such questions has taken the legal world by storm. In
its relatively brief life span, Chevron has been cited in 11,760 judicial
decisions and 2,130 administrative decisions.2 It continues to accumulate
judicial citations at the rate of about 1000 per year. It is eclipsed only by
decisions like Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 3 (14,663 decisions) and Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twomb y4 (47,339 decisions). The company it keeps confirms its
status as a leading decision prescribing the standard of review across a wide
range of cases that come before the courts.
Chevron's significance goes far beyond its utility as a statement of the
standard of review, however. This is revealed by its frequency of citation in
law review articles. Chevron has been cited by 8,009 articles included in the
Westlaw database. 5 The fascination academics have for Chevron means it
has now been cited far more than Erie (5,052), a decision Bruce Ackerman
once described as the "Pole Star" for an entire generation of legal
scholarship. 6 Indeed, Chevron's frequency of citation in law review articles
puts it in roughly the same league as Marbuy v. Madison7 (8,492), which is
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Although the West Reporter system, law reviews, and
casebooks routinely get it wrong, the correct form of citation of the decision, following the
official US. Reports, has no commas in the petitioner's name.
2. This and all following citation counts are based on Westlaw searches conducted on
July 28, 2011.
3. 304 U.S. 64(1938).
4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5. Chevron has also been cited in 30 American Law Reports articles, 58 Westlaw
journals, and over 3,600 miscellaneous other pieces of legal authority including digests,
practice guides, circulars, and practitioner's handbooks.
6. BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4
(1977).
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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perhaps appropriate given that Chevron has been called the "counter-
Marbuy" for the administrative state. 8
As suggested by its frequent appearance in law reviews, Chevron is also a
controversial decision. The opinion marks a significant shift in the
justification for giving deference to agency interpretations of law. Before
Chevron, deference was justified largely on pragmatic grounds; after Chevron,
deference has been justified largely in terms of implied delegations of
authority from Congress. This shift in the theoretical underpinnings of the
deference doctrine has made Chevron a magnet for commentators, with the
result that "the Chevron doctrine" has been debated, analyzed, and
measured in countless articles.
Legal revolutions are rare, and the general proposition for which Chevron
stands-that courts should accept reasonable agency interpretations of
statutes they are charged with administering-was not in and of itself
revolutionary. The Court had said something similar in previous
decisions. 9 What was new was the wayJusticeJohn Paul Stevens creatively
packaged this proposition in his opinion for a unanimous but short-handed
Court of six justices. The Chevron opinion contains four significant
innovations relative to previous judicial discussion.
First, the Court laid down a new two-step framework for reviewing
agency statutory interpretations. At what was quickly dubbed "step one,"
courts, using "traditional tools of statutory construction," ask whether
Congress had a "specific intention" with respect to the issue at hand. ' 0 "If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.""l But if no clear congressional intent can be discerned, then
the court, at "step two," determines whether the agency's interpretation
was a "permissible construction of the statute."' 2 The court should not ask
whether the agency construction is the one "the court would have reached
if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding;" it is enough to
show that "reasonable" interpreter might adopt the construction. 13
This two-step framework seems innocuous enough, but in fact contained
subtle but significant departures from prior law. That law had been
something of a hodge-podge, but the conventional wisdom was that it
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is,
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2589 (2006).
9. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
10. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9, 845
(1984).
11. Id. at 842-43.
12. Id. at 843.
13. Id. at843n.11, 844.
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required courts to assess agency interpretations against multiple contextual
factors, such as whether the agency interpretation was longstanding,
consistently held, contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute,
thoroughly considered, or involved a technical subject as to which the
agency had expertise. 14 The two-step formula provided no logical place for
courts to consider these contextual factors. 15
The two-step formula also implied that deference to the agency
interpretation was all-or-nothing. If the court decided the matter at step
one, the agency would get no deference (although the court might uphold
the agency if it agreed that its interpretation was the one intended by
Congress); if the court decided the matter at step two, the agency would get
maximal deference. In contrast, the prior approach had seemed to suggest
that any particular agency interpretation would get more or less deference
along a sliding-scale, depending on how it stacked up against the traditional
factors.
Second, Chevron departed from previous law by suggesting that Congress
has delegated authority to agencies to function as the primary interpreters
of statutes they administer. Sometimes, the Court noted, Congress
expressly delegates authority to agencies to define specific statutory
provisions by regulation. In these circumstances, the Court observed,
agency regulations are "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 16 The opinion then
immediately noted that delegations can be implicit rather than explicit, and
seemed to suggest that the same consequences would follow. By equating
explicit and implicit delegations to agencies to fill in statutory gaps, the
Court seemed to say that anytime Congress charges an agency with
administration of a statute and leaves an ambiguity in the statute, it has
impliedly delegated primary authority to the agency to interpret the statute.
This vastly expanded the sphere of delegated agency lawmaking.
Third, Chevron broke new ground by invoking democratic theory as a
reason for deferring to agency interpretations of statutes. In an unusual
passage near the end of the opinion, the Court explained that judges "are
14. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Seegeneraly Colin S. Diver,
Statutoy Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 562 (1985); Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969, 972-75 (1992).
15. Indeed, it appears Chevron has had a marked effect in reducing consideration of
these factors by reviewing courts. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron. An Empirical
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the US. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 46 (1998)
(reporting that in 1995 and 1996, only 5% of the courts of appeals decisions that applied
Chevron considered the traditional contextual factors).
16. 467 U.S. at 844.
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not part of either political branch" and hence "have no constituency."' 17
Agencies, while "not directly accountable to the people," are subject to the
general oversight and supervision of the president, who is elected by all the
people. Hence, it is fitting that agencies, rather than courts, resolve "the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities."' 18 The new
emphasis on democratic theory reinforced the presumption of delegated
interpretational authority, and seemed to offer a universal reason to prefer
agency interpretations to judicial ones.
Fourth, Chevron introduced the theme of comparative institutional choice
into statutory interpretation. Prior to Chevron, it was universally assumed
that it is the province of the courts to "say what the law is," including
pronouncing on the meaning of statutes. 19 After Chevron, courts and
commentators gradually came to realize that other institutions (such as
administrative agencies) may have a comparative advantage as interpreters,
at least in some circumstances. This in turn introduced a meta-question
into the theory and practice of statutory interpretation, namely determining
the "preferred interpreter" before engaging in the process of interpretation.
The full implications of this new perspective have yet to be fully assimilated,
but it may ultimately revolutionize the process of statutory interpretation. 20
Most landmark decisions are born great-they are understood to be of
special significance from the moment they are decided. But Chevron was
little noticed when it was decided, and came to be regarded as a landmark
case only some years later. This may be the most interesting aspect of the
Chevron story-how a decision that was considered routine by those who
made it came to be regarded as one of potentially transformative
significance. Before we get to that part of the story, however, we need to
understand what Chevron did decide, and why.
I. THE BUBBLE CONTROVERSY
When it was briefed and argued, no one thought Chevron presented any
question about the court-agency relationship in resolving questions of
interpretation. Instead, all understood the case to be about the "bubble
concept," a catchy phrase for a particular way of interpreting the term
17. Id. at 866.
18. Id. at 865-66.
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
20. For an example of this perspective, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006).
2014]
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"stationary source" under the Clean Air Act.21 One cannot understand
how Justice Stevens was able to obtain unanimous support for his
provocative opinion, or why that opinion came to have such compelling
power for lower court judges, without some sense of the controversy over
the bubble.
Three different programs established by the Clean Air Act require that
stationary sources of air pollution, like power plants and smelters, adopt
strict technology-based limitations on emissions. Each program kicks in
when firms either construct "new" stationary sources, or "modify" existing
stationary sources. The programs impose much less demanding limitations
on existing stationary sources. Yet each of the programs contains a critical
ambiguity about the meaning of "source": it is unclear whether this word
refers to each apparatus that emits pollution within a plant, or whether it
refers to the entire plant.
Under the apparatus definition, if a plant installs a new apparatus like a
boiler with a smoke stack, this would be new source. Hence the new boiler
would have to comply with tough technology-based controls. The plant-
wide definition, in contrast, in effect puts an imaginary bubble over an
entire industrial complex and looks at changes in the amount of pollution
coming out of a hole at the top. Under this bubble definition, if a firm adds
a new boiler with a smoke stack, but makes offsetting changes in other parts
of the operation such that the net effect is to reduce or hold pollution levels
unchanged, the addition of the new boiler would be neither a new source
nor a modification of a source. Hence the change could be ignored for
regulatory purposes.
The bubble concept was controversial from the time it was first proposed
in the early 1970s. Environmentalists generally opposed the bubble
because they saw it as locking in the environmental status quo. Suppose a
plant consists of four apparatuses, each of which emits 100 tons of pollution
per year, for total emissions of 400 tons. A new apparatus subject to new-
source controls would emit only 25 tons of pollution. Under the bubble
concept, the plant could continue to rebuild itself indefinitely, replacing
each uncontrolled apparatus with a new uncontrolled apparatus as the old
one wore out. Each replacement would result in no net addition of
pollution from the plant, and so the tough technology-based standards
would never be triggered. After a while, the plant would consist of nothing
but new apparatuses, and yet it would still be emitting 400 tons of pollution,
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767 lq. I will follow convention in citing to the section numbers
of the Act as they appear in the Statutes at Large. Thus, Clean Air Act (CAA) § 11 (a)(3),
the definition of "stationary source" under Section 111 of the Act, corresponds to 42 U.S.C.
§ 741 l(a)(3) in the United States Code.
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rather than the 100 tons it would emit if each apparatus had been
regulated. The objectives of the new source provisions would be evaded,
and no further progress would be made in cleaning up the air, as the
accompanying graphic illustrates.
Industry representatives and economists countered with a different
example. Suppose, as before, a plant with four apparatuses, each emitting
100 tons in an unregulated state. Now suppose that the plant wants to
expand output by adding a fifth apparatus. Under the narrow single-
apparatus definition of source, the new apparatus would be subject to
controls, and would emit 25 tons. So the plant would now emit a total of
425 tons. Under the bubble policy, however, the plant could escape
technology-based controls if it could somehow hold total emissions from the
plant to 400 tons or less. Suppose it could do this relatively cheaply by
retrofitting the existing apparatuses with a device that reduces emissions
from 100 to 75 tons and by installing the device on the new apparatus. The
result would be to reduce total emissions from the plant from 400 (4 x 100)
to 375 tons (5 x 75). Application of the bubble in this example could save
the plant considerable money and would also result in a better outcome for
the environment-375 tons of pollution per year versus 425 tons of
pollution, again illustrated graphically.
Bubble Hyobbee
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As with other attempts to resolve policy disputes by hypothetical
example, the outcome depends on the assumptions built into the example.
The case for the single-apparatus definition turns on the assumption that
there is a sharp discontinuity between old equipment and new equipment.
Old equipment is highly polluting, too costly to retrofit, and will inevitably
be replaced by new equipment because of technological obsolescence.
Thus, the best policy is hang tough and insist that technology-based
standards apply to each apparatus, because over the long run this will do
the most to improve air quality. The case for the bubble concept rests on
the assumption that there is more of a continuous function between the
costs and benefits of retrofitting existing equipment versus installing new
equipment. Sometimes retrofitting old equipment might yield more
environmental benefits at lower costs than scrapping old equipment and
replacing it with new. Thus, the best policy is to give firms general
pollution-reduction goals combined with considerable flexibility in
determining how to go about meeting those goals.
II. BLOWING BUBBLES IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) first encounter with the
bubble debate came in connection with the administration of the New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) established by Section 11 1 of the
Clean Air Act of 1970. The NSPS applied to "new sources," which were
defined as "any stationary source, the construction or modification of
which" begins after a NSPS for that category of sources is published. 22
"Stationary source" was defined in turn as "any building, structure, facility,
or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." 23
"Modification," for its part, was strictly defined to mean any change in a
source "which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such
source." 24  EPA's initial regulations simply repeated the statutory
definitions without clarifying whether "source" means apparatus or an
entire plant. 25
In 1975, after a vigorous lobbying campaign by the nonferrous smelting
industry, EPA endorsed a modest form of the bubble concept under Section
I 11.26 EPA decided that "facility" means a single apparatus, and "source"
22. CAA§ 111(a)(2).
23. Id.§ 111(a)(3).
24. Id. § 11 (a)(4).
25. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,875,
24,977 (Dec. 23, 1971).
26. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416 (Dec.
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means either a single apparatus or a complex of apparatuses. Consistent
with this "dual definition" of stationary source, EPA amended its
regulations to define "source" to mean any "building, structure, facility, or
installation" which "contains any one or combination of' facilities. 27 This
definition implicitly rejected the bubble, which requires that "source" mean
the entire plant. The agency nevertheless went on to endorse a qualified
form of the bubble in a separate provision of the regulations dealing with
the meaning of "modification." Here, EPA provided that no modification
would be deemed to occur when an "existing facility undergoes a physical
or operational change" and the owner demonstrates that the "total
emission rate of any pollutant has not increased from all facilities within the
stationary source." '28
On cross petitions for review by ASARCO (a firm in the nonferrous
smelting industry) and the Sierra Club, a divided D.C. Circuit panel
rejected the bubble concept "in toto." 29 The majority opinion was written
byJudgeJ. Skelly Wright, 30 a staunch liberal who was prone to see industry
capture of administrative agencies in many of the regulatory controversies
that came before him. 31 Wright's opinion portrayed the controversy as one
in which EPA had caved in to industry by adopting a position "contrary to
both the language and the basic purpose of the Act." 32
As to the language of the Act, Judge Wright agreed with the Sierra Club
that the "plain meaning" of "source" could not be defined to mean both
"facility" and "combination of facilities" (although this was not the feature
of the regulation that pernitted the bubble-that was the definition of
"modification"). With respect to the purposes of the Act, Judge Wright
thought that the bubble would allow operators to evade their duty to install
pollution control systems based on best available technology, as long as they
could devise some way to keep total emissions from an entire plant from
increasing. As he vividly put it, "[t]reating whole plants as single sources
would grant the operators of existing plants permanent easements against
16, 1975).
27. Id. at 58,418 (amending 40 C.F.R. § 60.2) (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 58,419 (adding 40 C.F.R. § 60.14).
29. ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
30. Judge Harold Leventhal joined Judge Wright's opinion but wrote a separate
concurrence. Judge George MacKinnon wrote a dissenting and concurring opinion.
31. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1039, 1065-66 (1997) (citing judicial and extra-judicial writings of Judge Wright
exhibiting preoccupation with agency capture).
32. ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 328; see also id. at 329 (stating that EPA had supported the
qualified bubble "by examples drawn from circumstances peculiar to the nonferrous
smelting industry" which was an improper basis for regulations "setting standards for all
industries").
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federal new source standards and the worst polluters would get the largest
easements." 33 Thus, the bubble was incompatible with the central purpose
of Section 111, which Judge Wright said was to enhance air quality.
Neither ASARCO nor the EPA petitioned for certiorari, so the bubble was
dead for purposes of Section 111.
The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act added two additional new
source provisions to the Act. These provisions were applicable depending
on whether air quality in a particular region is better than or worse than
required by the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
established under the 1970 Act. New Part C, called Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD), was designed to impose limits on the
ability of states to allow clean air to deteriorate downward toward the
NAAQS level. New Part D, called Plan Requirements for Nonattainment
Areas (nonattainment program or NAP), was designed to prod states to
bring dirty air areas into compliance with the NAAQS. Each of these new
Parts included, among its regulatory instruments, new source review
provisions requiring states to adopt technology-based standards for certain
new and modified sources. Neither of the new provisions made any further
attempt to define "facility" or "source,"3 4 nor was there any cross reference
in either Part to the definition of "stationary source" in Section 111. Both
Parts, however, expressly incorporated the definition of "modification" set
forth in Section 111. 35
The 1977 Amendments were enacted after EPA had adopted the
qualified bubble under Section 111, but before that policy had been struck
down by ASARCO. When EPA issued regulations implementing the new
PSD program,36 it adopted for that program virtually the same qualified
bubble concept that had been invalidated by ASARCO. s7 The agency
reasoned that Congress, in adopting the 1977 amendments, had been made
aware of the definition of "modification" EPA had adopted under Section
111. Thus, when Congress directed that "modification" have the same
meaning for PSD purposes as under Section 111, it implicitly ratified EPA's
qualified bubble under PSD. 38
33. Id. at 329 n.40.
34. CAA § 3020).
35. Id. § 169(2)(C) (PSD); id. § 171(4) (NAP). The incorporation of the definition of
"modification" in the PSD program was added by a subsequent technical corrections
amendment. See Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a)(54), 91 Stat. 1393, 1402 (1977). It is codified as
a parenthetical in CAA § 169(2)(C) (definition of "construction").
36. 1977 Clean Air Act; Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 43 Fed.
Reg. 26,380 (June 19, 1978).
37. Id. at 26,394.
38. Id. at 26,403.
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The PSD regulations were challenged in the D.C. Circuit in Alabama
Power Co. v. Costle,39 a massive judicial review proceeding that entailed
dozens of issues besides the legality of the bubble policy. The panel issued a
per curium opinion summarizing its conclusions in June 1979, and issued its
final opinion in April 1980. The final opinion was divided up by the three
judges who heard the matter,40 each judge writing a separate section. The
challenge to the bubble was assigned to Judge Malcolm Wilkey, one of the
court's more conservative and pro-business members.
Judge Wilkey concluded that the statutory definition of "stationary
source" in Section 111 ("any building, structure, facility, or installation")
was the meaning Congress intended EPA to apply under the PSD
provisions. 41 Accordingly, to the extent EPA had sought to expand the
definition of major stationary source to include other terms (including
"combination thereof'), it was invalid under ASARCO. Similarly, since
Congress had specifically incorporated by reference the definition of
"modification" under Section 111, EPA's freedom to define that term was
also limited by ASARCO.
Judge Wilkey recognized that these rulings might impose regulatory
burdens on industry and EPA. He sought to soften the blow by indicating
that EPA had broad discretion to define the component terms of the
statutory definition of "source" (building, structure, facility, or installation)
in different ways in order to advance the purposes of different new source
programs. 42 In particular, Judge Wilkey noted that the occasions for review
of modifications would be reduced because the bubble definition of source
would be used for these purposes. 43
Judge Wilkey spent little time considering the text of the statute in
reaching the conclusion that the bubble was a permissible definition of
"source" in the context of the PSD program. Instead, the focus was on
policy. He made two principal points. First, in the dynamic American
economy, "alterations of almost any plant occur continuously." To appiy
the definition of "modification" to any individual apparatus would result in
burdensome and repetitious PSD review of many "routine alterations of a
plant." 44 Second, the PSD program was designed to prevent deterioration
of air quality, not enhancement of air quality. Thus, any definition other
than the bubble "would be unreasonable and contrary to the expressed
39. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
40. The panel consisted ofJudges Leventhal, Robinson, and Wilkey.
41. Id. at 395-96.
42. Id. at 397.
43. Id. at 400.
44. Id. at 401.
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purposes of the PSD provisions of the Act."'45 Whereas Judge Wright had
implied that the bubble was unlawful in any form under Section I 11, the
Wilkey opinion seemed to say that the bubble concept was required under
the PSD program.
The third leg of the new source review stool was the nonattainment
program, also added by the 1977 amendments. Here, EPA engaged in a
series of zigzag efforts to clarify whether the bubble should apply. In a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in response to the June 1979 per
curiam order in Alabama Power,46 EPA proposed a qualified bubble definition
of source that could be used by states in full compliance with Part D
requirements, while laggard states would have to use the apparatus
definition. 47 After the D.C. Circuit's full opinion in Alabama Power issued,48
EPA determined that the bubble had to be prohibited for all purposes
under the Part D program. The circuit court had ruled that the bubble was
inappropriate under programs designed to improve air quality, and the
nonattainment program was designed to improve air quality. 49
The election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 marked a major
shift in executive branch policy toward environmental and safety
regulation. The philosophy of deregulation, emphasizing the use of
markets and market-imitating mechanisms rather than centralized
regulatory controls, got its start earlier, as applied to traditional
transportation and infrastructural industries like airlines, trucking, railroads,
telephones and utilities. 50 The Reagan Administration broke new ground
by extending this philosophy to environmental and safety regulation.
Consistent with this new direction in policy, EPA announced that it had
decided to reconsider issues related to the definition of "source" under the
nonattainment and PSD new source review programs, as part of "a
Government-wide reexamination of regulatory burdens and complexities
that is now in progress." 51 The upshot was that the agency decided to
45. Id.
46. The Alabama Power panel released an order with a summary of its ruling in June
1979, but released its full opinion only in December, which was then further revised in April
1980.
47. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of State Implementation
Plans, 44 Fed. Reg. 51,924, 51,934 (Sept. 5, 1979).
48. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of State Implementation
Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980).
49. Id. at 52,746.
50. For general background, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 1323 (1998).
51. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans,
46 Fed. Reg. 16,280, 16,281 (Mar. 12, 1981). EPA did not propose to revisit the definition
of "source" under the NSPS, apparently on the ground that this would contravene the
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permit the states, at their election, to adopt an unqualified bubble definition
of source for both PSD and nonattainment purposes. 52 The change was
justified on the ground that allowing the states to choose the bubble
definition would give them "much greater flexibility in developing their
nonattainment... programs." 53
The new 1981 regulations were challenged in the D.C. Circuit by three
environmental groups, led by the Natural Resources Defense Council. The
case was assigned to a panel composed ofJudges Abner Mikva, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and William Jameson (a visiting senior district judge from
Montana). Judges Mikva and Ginsburg were both relatively liberal Carter
appointees. Judge Mikva would later resign to serve as White House
Counsel to President Clinton, and Judge Ginsburg would later be
appointed to the Supreme Court by Clinton.
The decision was unanimous to vacate EPA's regulations. Judge
Ginsburg's opinion for the court, stripped of details about the statutory and
regulatory background, reduced to a syllogism. 54 Alabama Power and
ASARCO "establish as the law of this Circuit a bright line test for
determining the propriety of EPA's resort to a bubble concept." 55 This test
provided that the bubble "is mandatory for Clean Air Act programs
designed merely to maintain existing air quality," but is inappropriate "in
programs enacted to improve the quality of the ambient air." 56 "The
nonattainment program's raison d'tre is to ameliorate the air's quality in
nonattainment areas sufficiently to achieve expeditious compliance with the
NAAQS." 57 Ergo the bubble could not lawfully be used under the
nonattainment program.
Judge Ginsburg made no attempt to determine whether the bubble
concept could be squared with the statutory meaning of "stationary
source," and she agreed with EPA that the legislative history was "at best
contradictory. '58 The opinion also gave short shrift to EPA's judgment
that application of the bubble, at least in the context of the nonattainment
program, would not interfere with efforts to achieve further improvements
judgment in ASARCO.
52. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans
and Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14,
1981).
53. Id. at 50,767.
54. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 726.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 726-27.
58. Id. at 727 n.39. Indeed, the opinion "express[ed] no view on the decision we would




in air quality. This was dismissed with the observations that it was
inconsistent with the agency's view a year earlier, and the agency had not
cited "any study, survey, or support" for its new position. 59 Ordinarily, this
would be an appropriate judicial response to a change in agency policy. 60
Here, however, EPA's previous position had been justified largely on the
ground that it was required by the D.C. Circuit's decisions in ASARCO and
Alabama Power. The demand for consistency in this context amounted to
privileging policy judgments previously reached by the D.C. Circuit.
Still, it is ironic in retrospect that Judge Ginsburg's opinion was the one
to be singled out for further review by the Supreme Court. Of the three
D.C. Circuit decisions dealing with the bubble controversy, the Ginsburg
opinion is the most restrained, in the sense of attempting to resolve the issue
through a good faith reading of existing legal authorities (in this case, circuit
precedent). The result reached-invalidation of the bubble in dirty air
areas--was no doubt one that was congenial to Judge Ginsburg and her
relatively liberal colleagues. But one does not get the impression that
Ginsburg was actively manipulating the arguments to reach this result. In
contrast, both Judge Wright's opinion in ASARCO and Judge Wilkey's
opinion in Alabama Power reflected transparent attempts to reach ends
consistent with the author's views of appropriate policy. The bubble
controversy suggests that D.C. Circuit judges were prone to substitute their
own preferences for those of EPA. But the most flagrant practitioners of
this activism were not directly implicated in the case that eventually went
before the Supreme Court.
III. AN INAUSPICIOUS DEBUT
In tracking the progress of Chevron in the Supreme Court there are a
number of sources to draw upon. The petitioning papers and merits briefs
are available, as is the transcript of oral argument. Robert Percival has
previously reported on information gleaned from Justice Thurgood
Marshall's and Justice Harry Blackmun's papers. 61 Blackmun's papers in
particular shed significant new information on the Court's internal
deliberations. Unlike Marshall, who did not participate in either the
argument or decision in Chevron, Blackmun was involved from beginning to
59. Id. at 727 n.41.
60. Courts frequently respond to agency deviations from prior policy by requiring an
explanation or new evidence in support of the change, a requirement sometimes called the
"swerve doctrine." See, e.g., Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34 (1st Cir.
1989).
61. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlightsfrom the Blackmun
Papers, 35 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,637, 10,642-43 (2005); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in
the Supreme Court. Highlights jfrom the Marshall Papers, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,613 (1993).
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end. More importantly, Blackmun was probably the most meticulous note-
taker among the justices during the time he sat on the Court.
After the D.C. Circuit denied petitions for rehearing en banc, Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. filed a petition for certiorari in December 1982, thereby securing
its name on the caption of the decision. The American Iron and Steel
Institute, an industry trade association, filed a separate petition in January
1983. The Solicitor General, who controls litigation by the executive
branch (including EPA) in the Supreme Court, took considerably longer to
decide what to do. A critical factor no doubt was the large controversy
then brewing in Washington about how reviewing courts should respond to
the Administration's aggressive new deregulation initiative. 62 The Supreme
Court had pending before it Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 63 in which the Reagan Administration, citing
costs and uncertain benefits, had rescinded a mandatory automobile passive
restraints rule adopted by the Carter Administration. The order had been
set aside by the D.C. Circuit because the agency had failed to consider
alternatives to rescission. In the Supreme Court, the Reagan
Administration was arguing that courts should give greater deference to
agencies when they deregulate than when they regulate, and that under the
more lenient standard, the air bag rescission should be upheld.
The bubble controversy presented another example of an
Administration deregulation initiative invalidated by the D.C. Circuit. No
doubt the proponents of deregulation within the Administration pressed the
Solicitor General to seek further review in Chevron in order to press ahead in
the campaign for deregulation. This advocacy may have tipped the
balance in favor of filing a government petition in Chevron, even though
there was no circuit conflict and the decision below simply followed two
previous decisions of the D.C. Circuit, neither of which the government
had seen fit to challenge.
For whatever reasons, the Solicitor General did not file the petition on
behalf of EPA until March 1983. Given the lateness of the government's
filing, State Farm was decided before the Court could act on the petitions in
Chevron. As it turned out, State Farm rejected the Administration's appeal for
greater deference to deregulation orders, and affirmed the D.C. Circuit's
decision invalidating rescission of the passive restraints rule, providing a
significant setback to the Administration's deregulation campaign. It is
hard to say how this outcome influenced Chevron, which was then briefed
62. For scholarship reflecting the controversy, see Cass Sunstein, Deregulation and the
Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177 and Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial
Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985).
63. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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and argued the following term. The setback in State Farm may have
tempered some of the arguments that the Solicitor General and the other
petitioners advanced in support of reversal. It is also possible-although
there is no direct evidence for this-that it may have caused some of the
justices to tilt more toward the government in Chevron, if only to avoid the
impression that the Court was taking sides in the deregulation debate.
In all events, there is nothing in the three petitions suggesting that the
parties were asking the Court to reconsider basic questions of court-agency
relations. The focus was on the practical significance of the bubble
concept, the confusion produced by the three D.C. Circuit decisions, and
the claim that the D.C. Circuit had overstepped established bounds of
judicial review. For example, the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari
said, "[t]he decision of the court of appeals is contrary to well established
limits upon the scope of judicial review of administrative action," citing
previous decisions deferring to "reasonable" interpretations by the
Administrator of the Clean Air Act. 64
Similarly, there is nothing in the merits briefs to suggest that the case was
seen as a vehicle for a major statement about statutory interpretation. The
Solicitor General's brief was prepared under the supervision of Paul Bator,
who had just arrived from Harvard Law School as the first "political"
Deputy Solicitor General. 65 The Bator brief advanced two themes that
appear to have influenced justice Stevens. First, the brief hammered on the
idea that the 1977 Amendments had not one purpose-improving air
quality in dirty air areas-but two purposes: improving air quality and
accommodating further economic growth in dirty air areas. This "two
purposes" idea was to become the linchpin of Justice Stevens' argument
that Congress had left the definition of source to be resolved by the agency
in light of these somewhat conflicting objectives. 66 Second, the Bator brief
planted the idea that "implied delegations" to agencies to fill gaps in
statutes should be treated no differently than express delegations of gap-
filling authority. This idea, which was quite novel in the context of
determining the standard of review of agency legal determinations, was
presented by the brief as a faithful representation of existing law. 67 Justice
64. Petition for Certiorari, Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
1982 LEXIS U.S. Briefs 1591 at *30 (Mar. 25, 1983).
65. For more on the background of the Bator appointment, see CHARLES FRIED,
ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND AccouNT 28-30
(1991).
66. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851-53
(1984).
67. Both the Bator brief and Justice Stevens quoted the following line from Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974): "The power of an administrative agency to administer a
[66:2
THE STORY OF CHEVRON
Stevens took the bait and offered a similar depiction of the law in his
Chevron opinion. In other respects, however, Justice Stevens largely ignored
the government's brief.68
The brief filed by respondent NRDC may have been more significant,
given what it did not say. NRDC's position in the D.C. Circuit had been a
strong one. Circuit precedent-ASARCO and Alabama Power-made the
legality of the bubble turn on whether the Clean Air Act program in
question was designed to enhance or maintain air quality, and the
nonattainment program was designed to enhance air quality. But when the
case moved up the judicial hierarchy to the Supreme Court, the bottom fell
out from under NRDC's position. The Supreme Court was not bound by
ASARCO or Alabama Power, and would consider the legality of the bubble in
terms of the primary statutory sources-the language and legislative history
of the Clean Air Act. To make matters more difficult, EPA's 1981
regulations avoided the internal inconsistency in the regulatory definition of
"source" that Judge Wright had exploited in ASARCO. Accordingly, the
only argument left to NRDC was that the statutory term "source" must
always mean apparatus, and can never mean plant. Its brief gamely
attempted to support this claim through a laborious reconstruction of the
legislative history of the new source programs, interwoven with the
administrative history of the bubble. But NRDC made no attempt to
defend the court of appeals' decision-usually a telltale sign of weakness.
The most striking aspect of the briefs is the absence of any direct
antecedent for the two passages for which Chevron is most famous, namely
the "two-step" approach to review questions of law, and the justification of
deference to agencies in terms of their relationship to the president. Justice
congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." This statement,
however, was addressed to agency authority to issue regulations, not the deference owed to
agency interpretations of statutes. In the context of determining the deference owed to
agency interpretations, the Court had previously applied the arbitrary and capricious
standard only in cases in which Congress had explicitly delegated authority to the agency to
define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S.
416, 424-26 (1977).
68. For example, one of the major themes of the government's presentation was
federalism. EPA's regulations, the Bator brief repeatedly stressed, simply gave states the
choice whether to adopt the narrow ("apparatus") definition of "source" or the broad
("bubble") definition in their implementation plans. In contrast, said the brief, the
respondents and the D.C. Circuit wanted to put the states in a federal straitjacket. Justice
Stevens barely touched on federalism in his opinion, however, and instead developed a




Stevens apparently came up with these innovations on his own.
Nor does the transcript of oral argument reveal much of significance.
Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Rehnquist were both absent from
the bench because of health problems. Bator argued for the petitioners;
David Doniger, a seasoned environmental lawyer, for the respondents.
The questioning was dominated by Justices White, Stevens, and Brennan,
and was directed more toward Bator than Doniger. Justice Blackmun's
notes taken at argument suggest that the colloquy left little impression on
him. He observed at the end of Doniger's presentation: "Few questions-
no one wishes to venture out."
Two days after the argument, on March 2, 1984, the justices assembled
to conference about the case. We learn the following from Justice
Blackmun's notes. Although the decision would ultimately be unanimous,
the vote at conference was 4-3 to reverse the D.C. Circuit's decision.
Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens and Powell voted to reverse. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and O'Connor voted to affirm. This
unusual lineup is confirmed by the fact that Justice White assigned the
opinion to Justice Stevens. 69 White would have the power of assignment
only if he were the most seniorJustice in the majority at conference, which
would require that both Burger and Brennan be in dissent. Blackmun's
notes further reveal that each of the justices voting to reverse was tentative
or doubtful about this disposition. Blackmun put a "?" after the "-" sign
beside the name of each of the justices voting to reverse, presumably
indicating that each of these justices expressed some hesitancy about his
vote.
As best I can make out from Blackmun's notes, the conference discussion
went something like this.70 Chief Justice Burger started things off with a
speech about how the D.C. Circuit was going "pretty far" in environmental
cases, and the Supreme Court was going to have "to settle" this. He
suggested the way to do so was by affirming. Blackmun expressed his
puzzlement with this reasoning by putting "??" next to the Chief Justice's
proposed disposition. Burger's comments, as recorded by Blackmun,
suggest that the ChiefJustice had only the most tenuous grasp of the issues
in the case.
Justice Brennan spoke next. Blackmun's notes suggest that Brennan was
much more on top of things, and did his best to convince the conference to
affirm. He gave a crisp summation of the bill of indictment against the
69. See infra for a discussion of the evidence for this.
70. I clerked forJustice Blackmun in the 1978-79 term but cannot claim any expertise
in deciphering his notes about conference, since he ordinarily provided his clerks with an
oral summary of the conference and did not share the notes themselves.
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bubble, consistent with the views expressed by his friend, Judge Wright, in
ASARCO. The dual definition of source was troublesome because it allowed
EPA to "have it both ways"; the result might not be "what Congress
intended"; the bubble would grant a plant a "perpetual" right to "pollute at
achieved level"; EPA had changed directions and hence was not entitled to
much deference.
The discussion then turned to Justice White. Blackmun's notes indicate
White started out by saying he was "very shaky" but inclined to reverse.
He indicated that he had been persuaded by Alabama Power. Blackmun's
notes do not elaborate on what White meant by this. On its face, the
comment is puzzling, since Judge Ginsburg writing for the D.C. Circuit had
relied on Alabama Power in holding the bubble unlawful in the context of the
nonattainment program. Perhaps White was referring to Judge Wilkey's
more general discussion in Alabama Power about the definition of "source,"
and to his conclusion that the language was broad enough to allow EPA to
define source differently under different programs, but this is speculation.
In any event, after White spoke, Blackmun's notes indicate that Chief
Justice Burger interjected: "& I might join;" in other words, Burger might
join an opinion to reverse.
With Marshall absent, the next speaker was Justice Powell. Although
Blackmun also marked Powell down as voting to reverse with a question
mark, Powell's comments seemed to follow fairly consistently the line taken
in the industry briefs. He said the statute was "complicated" and deference
was due to an agency "redetermination" of its policy. He too cited Alabama
Power as supporting reversal, without recorded elaboration. Powell also
observed that the states have primary responsibility for the nonattainment
program. "On policy," he said, the decision below would pose a problem
for "economic growth" and serve as a "disincentive" (presumably he meant
to plant modernization). Justice Rehnquist ordinarily would go next, but in
his absence the next speaker was Justice Blackmun himself. Blackmun
naturally did not take notes about his own comments, but his notes on the
case written shortly before the conference reveal that he had had trouble
making up his mind. Although he marked "-" at the bottom of his notes,
meaning reverse, one can clearly see beneath this mark that he had
originally written and later erased "+?"-suggesting that his initial
disposition was to affirm, although he had doubts about this. There is no
way to tell from the notes when Blackmun erased the "+?" and wrote "-"
over the top, although presumably it was sometime after his initial
preparation for the argument and before he spoke at conference.
Blackmun's law clerk had written a bench memo urging affirmance, and
possibly this influenced the Justice's initial response, but he must have
changed his mind while giving the matter further consideration.
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After Blackmun came Justice Stevens. Blackmun's notes record the
following interesting remarks. Stevens began by saying he was "not at
rest." Ideally, he observed, the definition of source ought to be the same
throughout the statute. In a mild rebuke to Justices White and Powell,
Stevens said he was not sure that Alabama Power was completely controlling.
The agency interpretation, however, was a "permissible reading" of the
statute. The House Report (by which he presumably meant the House
Conference Report) was "confusing!" He concluded: "When I am so
confused, I go with the agency."
Justice O'Connor, the newest Member of the Court, spoke last. Her
remarks betray a certain lack of sophistication. After voting to affirm the
lower court, she nevertheless indicated that the "bubble made sense as a
concept." The stumbling block for her seemed to be that the legislative
history provided no support for the EPA position. She concluded:
"Industry is suffering" and said the matter was "very painful for me."
What is one to make of this? Perhaps the most obvious point is that
there is nothing in the conference notes to suggest that the justices regarded
Chevron as a watershed case about the standard ofjudicial review. The case
presented nothing more than a puzzle about the legality of the bubble
concept. It is also interesting to note that the justices were quite focused on
what the legislative history did or did not say, and seemed quite conscious
of the lower court opinions. In contrast, Justice Blackmun's notes record no
comment from any justice about the specific language of the statute.
Chevron was decided at a time when the Court's statutory interpretation
opinions were devoted primarily to a search for legislative intentions as
revealed by legislative history. The conference notes suggest that the
justices thought about statutory interpretation questions the same way in
their deliberations.
What we did not know before, and is potentially significant in explaining
what happened, is that the conference vote was closely divided (4-3) and
that the justices, with the possible exception of Justice Brennan, all
expressed uncertainty or ambivalence about the proper outcome. This
meant that the assignment to write the majority opinion was an especially
challenging one. In order to hold a majority, the opinion writer would
have to unravel the legal complexities about the bubble concept in a
persuasive way, and would have to devise some way of framing the issue
that the doubters would find compelling.
One especially valuable document in the Blackmun papers is something
he called his "Opinion Log Sheet" which he kept for each argued case. It is
from this document that we learn Justice White, the senior justice voting
with the majority, assigned the opinion to Justice Stevens. The assignment
came on March 2, 1984, the same day as the conference, suggesting that
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White may have acted quickly to assert his prerogative, perhaps to forestall
any attempt by the ChiefJustice to assign the case (on the ground that he
had changed his mind and had decided to join the majority to reverse). 71
Justice Stevens' took over three months to prepare his opinion. This was
not an unusually long period of time, but in the context of a case argued at
the end of February, it meant that the draft opinion was not circulated until
June 11, only about three weeks before the justices were scheduled to
adjourn for the year. By this time in the annual opinion-writing cycle, the
justices were immersed in a frenzy of effort to get the last, most difficult
decisions out the door.72 In effect, the other justices were given virtually no
time to consider drafting concurring or dissenting opinions, or even to
suggest modifications to the Stevens' draft.
The official paper trail of memos following circulation of the draft
reveals the following. Justices Marshall and Rehnquist responded with
memos onJune 12 confirming that they should be shown as taking no part
in the decision in the case. Justice White, the assigning Justice, responded
the next day with a memo designed to give the Stevens' effort a boost:
"Please join me in your very good opinion in this case." On the 14th,
Stevens circulated a revised draft. Justice O'Connor then circulated a
memo indicating that after the argument, she had inherited a remainder
interest in trust in one of the companies in the case, and she was therefore
recusing herself. The Court was down to a bare quorum of six
participating justices. That same day, Justice Brennan circulated a memo
stating tersely: "Please join me." He offered no explanation for his change
of position from conference, where he had voted decisively to affirm.
Then, on June 18, Justice Blackmun, the ChiefJustice, and Justice Powell
joined in quick succession. The only comment beyond the perfunctory was
from the ChiefJustice, who declared with typical sangfroid: "With others, I
am now persuaded you have the correct answer to this case." Another
Stevens draft, with further minor changes, was circulated on June 19. The
decision was releasedJune 25.
This record of correspondence as preserved in the Blackmun papers
strongly suggests that no justice made any recommendations for
modifications in the Stevens opinion. Certainly, no recommendations were
made by formal memorandum addressed to the whole conference. It is
71. Stories abound that Chief Justice Burger would occasionally switch his vote after
conference in order to control assignment of the majority opinion. See BOB WOODWARD &
ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 64-66, 171 (1979).
72. Chevron was part of an avalanche of opinions handed down at the end of the 1983
term-a total of 39 decisions from June 25 (when Chevron was released) to July 5 (when the




conceivable that informal suggestions were made, either by private memo
or via law clerks. But if any such suggestions were made, they had only the
most modest impact. The draft opinion circulated on June 14 indicates
that it differs from the original draft only in terms of minor stylistic changes
and one new footnote. 73 And theJune 14 draft is virtually identical to the
opinion as released on June 25. If any justice harbored reservations about
Stevens' effort, those reservations were obviously suppressed in light of all
the other tasks that had to be completed to get to the end of the term.
Of the three preliminary drafts circulated by Justice Stevens, only the
draft of June 14, which was the one reviewed by Justice Blackmun, is
preserved in his papers. As was his custom, Justice Blackmun marked in
pencil throughout the draft, indicating by small circles what he regarded as
errors in spelling, grammar, and citation style. There are three arguably
more revealing marginal comments.
In the margin opposite footnote 34, Justice Blackmun has written
"footnotes!" The opinion is more than ordinarily loaded down with
footnotes, and the remark may reflect a sense of tedium in having to forge
through these complex materials. In the margin opposite the concluding
sentence of the section of the opinion devoted to legislative history, Justice
Blackmun has written "yg&" That sentence reads: "We conclude that it
was the Court of Appeals, rather than the Congress or any of the
decisionmakers who were authorized by Congress to administer this
legislation, that was primarily responsible for the 1980 position taken by the
agency." 74 It is possible this may have been the point in reading when
Justice Blackmun became fully convinced by Stevens' argument. 75 And on
the first page of the opinion, in the top left hand comer, Justice Blackmun
has written simply: "Whew!" In context, it is safe to say that this was an
expression of admiration for Justice Stevens' handiwork, and perhaps also a
sense of relief that the opinion handled the complicated issue in a way that
absolved Justice Blackmun of any further engagement with the matter.
"Whew!" may in fact provide the best clue as to how the Court came to
render such an emphatic and unanimous opinion in Chevron. Given that he
thought he had precarious support, Justice Stevens presumably worked
especially hard to produce a persuasive opinion. The result is impressive in
its craftsmanship. The opinion frames the standard of review in a bold new
73. The new footnote is number 22 in the opinion. It simply reports that the dispute in
the case concerns the meaning of the term "major stationary source," not the term
"proposed source." See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 849 n.22 (1984).
74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.
75. Justice Blackmun recorded no reaction to the passages in the next section of the
opinion about the illegitimacy ofjudges resolving contested policy questions.
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way designed to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of
the disposition for which Stevens was arguing. It meticulously dissects the
statutory and legislative history arguments. It ends on a high note designed
to carry the reader away with a paean to democracy and judicial restraint.
Circulated to his colleagues in the midst of the end-of-term crunch, this
over-achieving opinion more than carried the day-it swept the field.
IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LANDMARK
There is no evidence that Justice Stevens understood his handiwork in
Chevron as announcing fundamental changes in the law of judicial review.
Both before and after Chevron was decided, Justice Stevens authored
opinions that analyzed agency interpretations using the traditional factors
approach that pre-dated Chevron, and that many believe were superseded by
Chevron.76 In later years, when asked about his most famous opinion, Justice
Stevens would respond that he regarded it as simply a restatement of
existing law, nothing more or less. 77
The most striking evidence that Justice Stevens had no desire to modify
the status quo is provided by the remarkable Cardozo-Fonseca episode that
occurred less than three years after Chevron was decided. 78 Cardozo-Fonseca
was an immigration case, in which the Justice Department sought Chevron
deference for its interpretation of the legal requirements for establishing
asylum in the United States. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens stated
that no deference was appropriate, because the issue was a "pure question
of statutory construction for the courts to decide." 79  The discussion
strongly implied that Chevron-style deference was limited to questions of
"law-application," with "pure questions of law" being reserved for
independent judicial determination. There was support for such a
distinction in pre-Chevron case law.80 But the distinction is in apparent
conflict with Chevron, which drew no such dichotomy, and the issue in
Chevron itself should probably be regarded as a pure question of law-
76. See Conn. Dep't of Income Maint. v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985) (Stevens, J.);
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln People's Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 402-03 n.3
(1984) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
77. Justice Stevens is a graduate of Northwestern Law School, where I formerly served
as the John Paul Stevens Professor of Law. In that capacity, I was occasionally invited to
attend public events at which Justice Stevens agreed to speak when he came to Chicago. I
recall at least two occasions when someone in the question-and-answer session after the
speech asked him a version of the "what did you intend when you wrote Chevron?" question.
The answer was always that he regarded it simply as a restatement of established law.
78. See INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
79. Id. at 446.
80. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 428-430 (3d ed. 2004).
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whether "source" should be defined as apparatus or plant. That Stevens
would seek to deflate his Chevron opinion in this manner strongly suggests
that he had no design to change the multi-faceted approach to judicial
review of questions of law. Certainly he had no intention to restrict his own
discretion in future cases to call upon aspects of the traditional approach
that were downplayed in Chevron.81
Nor is there any evidence that Justice Stevens' colleagues on the Court
perceived Chevron as some kind of watershed decision, either when it was
decided or for some time afterwards. We have already seen that the
opinion generated no substantive comment from any member of the Court
when it was circulated in June of 1984. Further evidence that the justices
regarded Chevron as just another case is provided by the next term's
decisions. Although there were 19 argued cases in the next term that
presented some kind of question about whether the Court should defer to
an agency interpretation of statutory law, Chevron was cited in only one of
those cases. 82 Based on its initial trajectory as a precedent in the Supreme
Court, Chevron seemed destined to obscurity.
But Chevron was not to be relegated to obscurity, quite the contrary. We
can trace the ascendancy of the Chevron "two-step" approach to judicial
review in the Supreme Court's own body of decisional law. Beginning with
the 1985-86 term, Chevron began to appear with increasing frequency in the
Court's opinions. Six cases applied the Chevron framework in 1985-86, two
the next term, and five the term following that. 83 By the end of the 1980s,
the percentage of deference cases in the Supreme Court adopting the
Chevron framework had risen to around 4 0%; by the early 1990s it was up to
around 60%.84 Soon the Court began to debate, in the course of resolving
particular stationary questions, whether the Chevron approach should apply
or not. Thus, questions arose as to whether Chevron applies to pure
questions of law, whether Chevron applies to legal issues that arise in judicial
rather than administrative proceedings, and whether Chevron trumps
statutory interpretation precedents established in previous court cases. 85
81. Many years later, in Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009), Justice Stevens
authored a concurring opinion in which he again took the position that Chevron does not
apply to pure questions of law.
82. Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985). For overall
data on the 1984 Term, see Merrill, supra note 14, at 1038-39.
83. Merrill, supra note 14, at 1036-38.
84. See data presented in Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q 351, 359-60 (1994).
85. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (judicial proceedings); Maislin
Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990) (judicial precedent); INS v.
Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (pure questions of law). For an overview of these
and other issues about the scope of Chevron that have arisen, see Thomas W. Merrill &
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Eventually, the Court was granting certiorari and devoting entire cases to
questions about the scope of "the Chevron doctrine," such as whether it
applies to interpretations announced in agency adjudications or opinion
letters.86
How did Chevron, after such an inauspicious beginning, acquire this status
as a core precedent of administrative law? Two explanations seem most
plausible. The first focuses on the D.C. Circuit, and posits that Chevron
became a leading case initially in the D.C. Circuit, and then migrated back
to the Supreme Court along with personnel who had previously served in
the D.C. Circuit. The second focuses on the role of the Executive Branch,
and posits that Justice Department lawyers, perceiving the advantages of
Chevron's expanded rule of deference to administrative interpretations,
became persistent and eventually successful proselytizers for use of the
Chevron standard in reviewing agency interpretations of law.
The role of the D.C. Circuit in establishing Chevron as a landmark has
been suggested by others, 87 and is broadly consistent with much of the data
about Chevron's rise from obscurity. The D.C. Circuit is the court that hears
the highest percentage of cases involving judicial review of agency action.
Many of these cases involve disputes over whether to defer to agency
interpretations of law. If the D.C. Circuit were to adopt Chevron's "two-
step" formula as the dominant standard for judicial review of questions of
law, it could then have been transplanted back to the Supreme Court by
employees of the D.C. Circuit who were promoted to service on the
Supreme Court. The most prominent of these promoted employees, of
course, was Antonin Scalia, who was a judge on the D.C. Circuit when
Chevron was handed down in 1984, and was elevated by President Reagan
to the Supreme Court in 1986, where he promptly became the Court's
foremost champion of Chevron. In addition, a disproportionately large
number of Supreme Court law clerks serve as clerks to D.C. Circuit judges
before they go on to clerk for justices on the Supreme Court. They too
would be familiar with Chevron, and would be expected to turn to its two-
step formula in drafting opinions for Supreme Court justices dealing with
judicial review of questions of law.
Some evidence tending to support this reverse-migration hypothesis is
provided by the previously mentioned Cardozo-Fonseca episode. The case
was decided in Justice Scalia's first year on the Supreme Court, and the
junior Justice took it upon himself to write a concurring opinion chastising
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. LJ. 833 (2001).
86. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (opinion letters); INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (agency adjudication).
87. See LAWsON, supra note 80, at 449.
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Justice Stevens for his "eagerness to refashion important principles of
administrative law in a case in which such questions are completely
unnecessary to the decision and have not been fully briefed by the
parties."8 8 Justice Scalia objected to justice Stevens' suggestion that Chevron
concerned only questions of law application, observing that Chevron "has
been an extremely important and frequently cited opinion, not only in this
Court but in the Courts of Appeals."8 9 In effect, the newly arrived Justice
from the D.C. Circuit was telling his colleagues that Chevron was already
entrenched in the practice ofjudicial review in the D.C. Circuit, and major
revisions could be destabilizing.
In order to shed further fight on the reverse-migration hypothesis, I
examined all decisions of the D.C. Circuit citing to Chevron during the first
three years after the decision was handed down. The survey provides
further evidence confirming the broad outlines of the hypothesis. The D.C.
Circuit picked up on the Chevron two-step framework for reviewing agency
determinations of law very quickly. One early decision, Rettig v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp.,90 provided an elaborate paraphrase of the two-step
idea, in effect adopting it as the law of the Circuit. In all, the D.C. Circuit
handed down 23 decisions citing to Chevron in the first year after the
decision was announced. This grew to 40 in the second year, and 64 in the
third year after the decision was announced. This is a disproportionately
large percentage of Chevron citations relative to other courts of appeal. 9' By
the end of the second year, Chevron was already regarded as boilerplate
doctrine in the Circuit. One finds statements from this period describing
Chevron as the "now familiar framework," the "familiar two-step
framework," the "familiar dictates," or the standard that applies "as
always" in reviewing agency interpretations. 92
There has occasionally been speculation that Chevron was embraced with
particular fervor by the newly-appointed Reagan judges on the D.C.
88. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). There is
irony in this accusation, given that Chevron, the "important principle of administrative law,"
was itself less than three years old and had been "established" in a decision in which the
issues it dealt with had also not been briefed by the parties.
89. Id. at 454.
90. 744 F.2d 133, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
91. The D.C. Circuit citations represent about 40 % of all citations to Chevron at the
court of appeals level during the first three years. Today, by contrast, D.C. Circuit citations
to Chevron have fallen to about 17% of all court of appeals citations.
92. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Wald, CJ.) ("dictates"); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d 1423, 1426 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (StarrJ.) ("familiar two-step"); Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas v. DOT, 791 F.2d 202,
205 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, CJ.) ("always"); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 932
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (StarrJ.) ("familiar framework").
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Circuit.93 One can tell a plausible story in support of this surmise. During
these years, the D.C. Circuit was closely divided between Republican and
Democratic appointees. The Democratic judges were likely somewhat
hostile to the deregulatory initiatives of the Reagan Administration, and
would seek some way to strike them down. In contrast, the newly-
appointed Republican judges (who were gradually growing in number),
would be eager to find some way to uphold these initiatives. Perhaps these
Republican judges seized upon Chevron as the most effective weapon at
hand for upholding controversial administrative decisions.
The data, however, provide no support for such a supposition during the
first two years after Chevron was decided. The judge who cited Chevron most
frequently during these years was Judge Patricia Wald, a Carter appointee.
She was the author of Rettig, and is perhaps the judge most responsible for
the rapid assimilation of the two-step framework in the D.C. Circuit. Judge
Wald cited Chevron in 13 opinions in the first two years, easily outdistancing
the top Republican citer, Judge Kenneth Starr, who cited the case in 8
opinions. Indeed, Democratic appointees out-cited Chevron relative to
Republican appointees 38 to 21 in the first two years, and out-cited
Republicans 62 to 53 over all three years.
There are some interesting variations in citation patterns among the
judges in these early years, but they appear to have more to do with age
and openness to new precedent than with politics. Thus, Judge Spottswood
Robinson, the most senior Democratic appointee, made relatively little use
of Chevron, citing it only once the first two years. He tended to stick to the
traditional factors, and even after Chevron became established referred to it
mostly in string citations. Similarly, Judge Mikva never showed much
affinity for Chevron. Judges Wald and Harry Edwards, in contrast, who were
younger and arguably more open to change, made greater use of Chevron.
On the Republican side, Judge Starr, who was the youngest judge on the
Circuit, was the most frequent user of Chevron. In contrast, Judge Robert
Bork, who was more senior, made little reference to Chevron until the third
year after it came down (he cited it in only two opinions the first two years).
Interestingly, Judge Antonin Scalia, who was to become identified as
Chevron's champion after he was named to the Supreme Court, cited Chevron
in only three opinions while he sat on the D.C. Circuit.
93. For evidence that Democratic and Republican judges on the D.C. Circuit respond
differently to cases in ways that match their party affiliation, see Richard L. Revesz,
Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in
the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1106-09 (2001) (summarizing studies).
Interestingly, one study finds less political influence in Chevron cases than in cases presenting
procedural challenges to agency decisions. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
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In the third year of Chevron's existence, the picture begins to change
slightly, although this may be due to the fact that the Republican
appointees, with their increasing numbers, were getting more of the
opinion-writing assignments in major regulatory decisions. Republican
appointees in 1986-87 used Chevron slightly more than Democratic
appointees (32 to 25 citations in majority opinions). Judge Starr became
the leading user of Chevron that year (11 citations), slightly eclipsing Judge
Wald (9 citations). Judge Bork discovered Chevron (8 citations), as did Judge
Laurence Silberman (6 citations). On the other side of the aisle, after
Cardozo-Fonseca was decided late in the year, Judge Edwards mounted a
short-lived campaign to limit Chevron to cases involving "law application." 94
So there is some evidence that Chevron was becoming more of a Republican-
favored doctrine, and the Democrats were having second thoughts. But the
evidence is at most suggestive on this point. 95
I should add that there is little evidence, from these three years, that
Chevron caused the judges of the D.C. Circuit to become more deferential
toward administrative agencies. 96 In terms of cases citing Chevron in which
there was a clear disposition affirming or reversing the agency, affirmances
barely outnumbered reversals (64 to 52). If we look only at those cases that
expressly frame the inquiry in terms of Chevron's two-step formula, the ratio
of affirmances to reversals improves slightly (30 to 20). Of course, all this
could be due to selection effects: judges are more likely to select a
deference-promoting framework when they have decided to affirm (and
94. See Int'l Union v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards,J.); Regular
Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 820 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards,
J.). Early the next term, Justice Scalia announced in another concurring opinion that
Cardozo-Fonseca's "law application" interpretation of Chevron had been abandoned by the
Court (properly enough in his view). NILRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
484 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). The pure question of law/law
application distinction quickly disappeared. See Merrill, supra note 14, at 986 n.74.
95. About this time, a number of Republican-appointed judges took to writing about
Chevron in the law reviews. See Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3
YALEJ. ON REG. 283 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law
& Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821 (1990). Although this confirms that the D.C. Circuit
judges attributed great significance to Chevron, it would be difficult to characterize these
efforts as advocacy pieces. Judge Starr's article presented a carefully balanced view of
Chevron, and Justice Scalia's article took pains to point out that the Chevron standard did not
necessarily mean more deference to agencies.
96. In a widely cited study, Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott claimed that Chevron
caused an increase in deference to agency policy decisions in the lower courts. See Peter H.
Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative
Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984 (1990). But their methodology did not single out for study cases
that actually cited or relied on Chevron.
[66:2
THE STORY OF CHEVRON
need to justify this result) than when they have decided to reverse. Still, the
D.C. Circuit took virtually no time at all to learn how to reverse agency
interpretations at step one or step two of the Chevron framework. 97 The
much-debated question whether Chevron has had any impact on the degree
of deference judges actually give to agencies remains unresolved.
The second plausible explanation for Chevron's rise to fame is aggressive
promotion by the Executive Branch lawyers. Chevron was regarded as a
godsend by Executive Branch lawyers charged with writing briefs defending
agency interpretations of law. Not only did the two-step standard provide
an effective organizing principle for busy brief-writers, the opinion seemed
to say that deference was the default rule in any case where Congress has
not spoken to the precise issue in controversy. Since this describes (or can
be made to seem to describe) virtually every case, Chevron seemed to say that
the government should nearly always win. Chevron may have meant little to
the justices when it was decided, and it may have taken time for courts
other than the D.C. Circuit to accept it as orthodoxy. But it was quickly
seized on as a kind of mantra by lawyers in the Justice Department, who
pushed relentlessly to capitalize on the perceived advantages the decision
presented.98
Enthusiasm for Chevron among government lawyers is one thing;
acceptance by courts is another. But here it is plausible to suppose that the
Justice Department's role as the ultimate institutional litigant is relevant.
The Department urged that Chevron serve as the relevant standard of review
at nearly every turn, and the Department appeared in court much more
frequently in cases raising questions about review of questions of law than
any other category of litigant. It is not difficult to imagine that over time
the Department's persistence would pay off, and courts would start to
regard Chevron as the accepted standard. 99
These two explanations for Chevron's delayed investiture as a landmark
decision-migration from the D.C. Circuit and executive advocacy-are
97. See, e.g., Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Wald, CJ.) (reversing agency interpretation as unreasonable at step two of Chevron); FAIC
Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (reversing agency
interpretation as contrary to statute at step one of Chevron).
98. From 1987 to 1990, I served as Deputy Solicitor General in the Justice
Department, overseeing appeal authorization and Supreme Court litigation in civil cases.
After only a few months on the job, I joked to friends that I was the Deputy Solicitor
General for Chevron, since it seemed that virtually every request from the Civil Division for
appeal authorization or for Supreme Court participation was based on the need to expand
or defend the Chevron doctrine.
99. The classic study of the advantages of being an institutional litigant is Marc
Galanter, Wy the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'YREv. 95 (1974).
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by no means inconsistent. To the contrary, they are mutually supportive.
The Justice Department's impact as an institutional litigant might well be
the strongest in the D.C. Circuit, given the very high concentration of
administrative law cases in that circuit. So executive advocacy may help
explain why Chevron caught on first in the D.C. Circuit. Moreover, the
Justice Department, through the Office of Solicitor General, is by far the
most important institutional litigant in the Supreme Court. So executive
advocacy may have played a reinforcing role in Chevron's migration back to
the Supreme Court. Perhaps most importantly, vigorous advocacy of
executive branch prerogatives served the interests of both D.C. Circuit
judges seeking promotion to the Supreme Court--such promotions being
controlled by the White House-and Justice Department lawyers seeking
victories in court. Both sets of aspirants had a stake in supporting an
expansion of executive power, making Chevron's rhetoric of implied
delegations of executive authority congenial to both.
CONCLUSION
Chevron presents a striking instance of a case that became great not
because of the inherent importance of the issue presented, but because the
opinion happened to be written in such a way that key actors in the legal
system later determined to make it a great case. Chevron became a
landmark decision due to the cumulative effect of a series of fortuitous
events, among them Justice White's assignment of the case to Justice
StevensJustice Stevens' creative restatement of certain principles ofjudicial
review of questions of law, the lack of scrutiny given the Stevens opinion by
other justices, Judge Patricia Wald's quick embrace of the two-step formula
in the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia's elevation to the Supreme Court from
the D.C. Circuit two years later, and the Justice Department's unrelenting
campaign to make Chevron the universal standard for judicial review of
agency interpretations of law. Individually, each of these events is readily
explicable; cumulatively, they would have to be described as an accident.
There is no evidence that Chevron has led to a greater rate of acceptance
of agency interpretations of statutes by the Supreme Court. 00  The
evidence of its effect on acceptance of agency views by lower courts is
mixed. 101 Nevertheless, Chevron's impact on the legal system has been
100. For the most recent and comprehensive review, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
101. In addition to Kerr, supra note 15, Revesz, supra note 93, and Schuck & Elliott, supra
note 96, see also Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 L. &
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profound. By separating out for judicial determination the question
whether the statute has a clear or unambiguous meaning, and suppressing
other contextual variables traditionally considered by courts in considering
agency interpretations, the decision subtly but profoundly reinforced the
movement toward textualism in statutory interpretation. By highlighting
agency accountability to the president, and the judiciary's lack of
democratic pedigree, the decision accelerated the movement toward
"presidential administration."'' 02 Perhaps most importantly, the decision
has led to a sustained discussion among judges and academics about the
proper role of courts in the administrative state, and has ignited an
awareness of questions of institutional choice that have long remained
submerged. It is not overstating the matter to say that Chevron has become
one of a handful of decisions-along with Marbuy v. Madison, Brown v. Board
of Education, and Roe v. Wade-that are the material for a continuing
collective meditation about the role of the courts and indeed of the law itself
in the governance of our society.
The wonder of it all is that the Court that rendered this decision had
utterly no intention of producing such an opinion. Indeed, the Court did
not even realize it had produced such an opinion until others pointed this
out. Chevron reminds us that sometimes in the pressure -of events a
remarkable document emerges that becomes the focus of collective
deliberation about matters of great importance. The author of such a
document is as much the times in which it is rendered as the individual who
strings the words together and puts them on paper.
CONTEMP. PRoBS., 65 (Spring 1994); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE
LJ. 2155 (1998);JasonJ. Czamezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutoty
Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 767 (2008);
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatoy Polig? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CH. L. REv. 823 (2006).
102. See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245 (2001).
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